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Prima ar fi criza de identitate. Ginet does not exactly tell us what makes an attitude like intention de re or, in his terms, directly referential ; rather, he takes the notion of de re attitude for granted. The Acausal Account of Intentional Action The aim of my paper filozofie to explore the limits of Ginet s account of intentional action.

But let me start with an outline of the account itself.

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For the sake of exposition, instead of using variables for individuals and actions, like S, X, A, I will be talking of arbitrary agents, like John, myself, and the actions of raising hands and dancing. Suppose that John intentionally raises his hand, in order to vote at a meeting. An Incompatibilist Account”, Philosophical Perspectives 3 It was a genuine action that John did for a reason, namely, to vote.

Ginet offers his indeterministic account of action in response to the dilemma of free will. When John fjlosofie his hand, it was still in his power to do otherwise.

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If his action had been determined by the previous state of affairs, it is unclear how he could be justifiably held responsible for his action.

At the same time, John did what he did for a reason, in order to vote. If John had not intended to raise his hand, e. Intentional action may be defined as follows: I intend to raise my hand if and only if as I am raising it, I have some directly referential intention cojtemporane the raising of my hand, such as the intention that by doing it I will express my vote. The notion of intention, qua a kind of attitude, will be taken for granted. My concern will bear on the relation between the intention and the intended action.

What makes an intention be about an action?

Surprisingly enough, there does not seem to be much competition. I will show that when we plug the standard view into Def. The concept of direct reference is primarily used to account for the.

It brings the reference, and nothing but the reference, to what I said. First of all, how can something that is not an expression be directly referential? We may say that an intention and generally, an attitude is directly referential if and only if it can only be expressed using directly referential expressions. In other words, an attitude is directly referential iff its content can only be specified by means of devices like demonstratives.

There will be many de re attitudes.

I express my de re belief about that particular cherry. And when I eat it, it is not just that I wanted to eat any given cherry. I intended to eat that particular cherry. I had a de re 2 Russell B. For one, I myself have presented a number of criticisms cf. But for the sake of the discussion in the present paper, problems with the standard view of direct reference may be safely set aside.


C1 Concurrently with her action of V-ing, S intended by that action to U S intended of that action that by it she would U.

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Ginet is not really interested in tdmatizari kind of de re intentions, namely, intentions about things in our environment upon which we act. My action is intentional if and only if I have an accompanying de re intention about it. The definition still needs amendment. For one thing, some intentions, albeit de re, should clearly not make the action intentional.

Consider a person who is having an eye-twitch. She is also desperately trying to stop it. As she is twitching, she has an accompanying de re intention about that particular twitching, that it would stop. However, her de re intention clearly does not turn her eye-twitching into an intentional action. So we need to refine Def. However, I will not pursue this point any further here.

For, if an attitude is to be about something, then, according to the standard understanding of direct reference, there must be a suitable causal link from the thing to the attitude, not the other way round.

So, the action cannot at the same time cause and be caused by the intention, for otherwise, we would have a causal loop. Suppose that I want to 5 See e.

That is to say, I have the intention to impress John by making that rumba move. Now suppose that, as John comes into the ballroom, my wish to impress him becomes so intense that it triggers a muscle spasm in my hips, which makes me move them precisely in the given way.

So I move my hips and, let us suppose, I do impress John. But was my action intentional? Was that particular move of my hips something that I had intended? People s intuition is that it was not, in spite of the fact that my desire to impress John caused me to move my hips the way I did.

A moving of my hips is intentional if and only if I have an accompanying intention that by that very motion of my hips I would, say, impress John. If I am, so to speak, taken by surprise, and I just find myself moving my hips so, it is still open to me either to intend this action to have such-and-such effect, or not have any intentions whatsoever about it.

My having or lacking a suitable intention determines whether I intend or not to be doing what I am doing. The problem resides in intentions. I will present a case in which an agent raises his hand and has a accompanying de re intention, of a suitable kind, about his action. However, the causal link from the action to the intention that makes it a de re intention is, as it were, deviant.

It cannot be too deviant, though, because it has to secure the de-re-ness of the intention. But it is deviant enough to pose a problem for Ginet s proposal. Suppose that John is a neuroscientist, and is interested in action and causation. His team is carrying out the following experiment. He is aware of all the activities going on in the various areas of the subject s brain, and is able to track them.

His job is to cause the relevant neurons to fire, so as to trigger muscle contractions, and make the subjects raise their hand. When the subject raises his or her hand and does not form any accompanying intention about his or her movement, the action is clearly not intentional. The subject simply raises his or her hand, but does not intend to do so.

John is certainly aware of the subjects action of raising their hand. For, if he were not aware of it, how would have he been able to go on with his experiment, which precisely consists in causing and controlling the given action? Obviously, John can have de re attitudes about the subjects actions. For example, he may believe of a given subject s hand-raising that it will draw the attention of his colleagues. John is not a mere spectator. Through electronic manipulation, he is in the position of controlling the subjects actions, and he can therefore even form de re intentions about those actions.


He may intend of a given action that it would draw the attention of his colleagues. So far, so good. But now suppose that John himself, perhaps 6 In other words, as the subject is raising her hand, she may have the feeling that she is doing it voluntarily, but she may also be unaware or her movement.

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Ginet wants to say that the action in this other case is intentional, even though it has been caused by electronic manipulations p. Suppose that the subject on whom John is working is John himself which he may ignore.

By a direct electronic manipulation of his own neural events, John produces an appropriate firing of neurons, which triggers a muscle contraction that results in the event of John raising his hand.

John also has a de re intention about the action that he has produced, namely, about his own handraising, e. The conditions for intentional action are, then, all met: He raised his hand, and he intended to raise it, for he intended that that particular action would make him famous. But this is clearly wrong; in the case that I have presented, we would not want to say that John raised his hand in order to become famous. Ginet s account therefore fails.

Let me forestall some tentative objections to my argument. One might challenge the claim that John s cognitive access to the action at stake is direct enough for him to have de re attitudes about it.

However, it is beyond doubt that John is in a position to demonstratively refer to the action. So, if Ginet s account builds upon the standard view of direct reference, I do not see how one could deny that John s attitude is a de re attitude.

Now, one might point contemporqne that we constantly use demonstratives to refer to actions of other people. For comparison, consider the following case. I am in the ballroom, which happens to have large mirrors. In one of the mirrors, I see a. The person happens to be me, but I do not realize that. That particular action, of that person i. I can even say things like: I hope that this will make everyone see how ridiculous she is. Don filosodie I have, then, a de re intention, to the effect that in virtue of that action everyone would see that the agent is ridiculous?

And if I do, then we ought to say that the moving of my hips was intentional, since by it I intended to make everyone see how filosofis I was. In other words, we would have to say that I moved contmeporane hips in order to make myself ridiculous, which is intuitively wrong.